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Home/Russia/AS6789
Autonomous System

CRELCOM LLC

AS6789RussiaRIPE NCC · since 1996NSPPeering: Open

CRELCOM-NET

crelcom.ru
CRELCOM LLC website
B76/100Good

BGP report

Ranked 1,243 of 5,050 networks in Russia, 354 of 841 ISPs and transit networks. World rank 33,911.

  • RPKI ROA6/30
  • IRR route objects20/20
  • Upstream redundancy15/15
  • Global visibility10/10
  • IPv610/10
  • PeeringDB10/10
  • Prefix aggregation5/5

Computed from the route collector snapshot, IRR, RPKI and PeeringDB. How it is scored

Score history

IRR route objects

Needs work
20/20

68 prefixes have an exact route object, 2 are covered by a larger one, 1 have none.

Upstreams and IXPs build prefix filters from the IRR. Prefixes without a route object can be dropped silently.

How to fix
  1. Create route (IPv4) and route6 (IPv6) objects with your AS as origin in your RIR's IRR (for example APNIC via MyAPNIC, or IDNIC), or in RADB.
  2. Group your customers in one as-set and list it in PeeringDB so upstreams can build filters automatically.
No route object (1)
Covered by a larger object (2)

Global visibility

Needs work
10/10

70 of 71 prefixes are seen by at least half of the full-table feeds worldwide.

Prefixes seen only partly are usually caught by filters (no ROA or route object), too specific, or announced to domestic IXPs only.

How to fix
  1. Check the ROA and route object of those prefixes, and keep them no longer than /24 for IPv4 or /48 for IPv6.
Prefixes with low visibility (1)

IPv6

Good
10/10

2 IPv6 prefixes announced.

Most mobile users and large services already run on IPv6.

PeeringDB

Good
10/10

Profile exists, listed at 5 IX.

Prospective peers and upstreams look up your contacts, policy and as-set in PeeringDB.

Prefix aggregation

Good
5/5

69 IPv4 prefixes could be summarized into 48.

Deaggregation grows the global routing table. Splitting for traffic engineering is still reasonable.

Dropping invalid routes (ROV)

Note

Seen passing on 7 RPKI-invalid routes of other networks in sampled paths. This suggests the AS does not drop all invalid routes, for example those from its customers.

Not part of the score. It is inferred from sample AS paths, so the routes may come from exempted customers.

How to fix
  1. Run an RPKI validator (for example Routinator or rpki-client) and reject invalid routes on your BGP sessions. MikroTik RouterOS 7 supports this through /routing rpki and the rpki-verify filter.
Example invalid routes (4)

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