BGP report
World rank 82,636.
Computed from the route collector snapshot, IRR, RPKI and PeeringDB. How it is scored
RPKI ROA
Problem0 of 19 prefixes have a matching ROA (valid). 19 invalid, 0 without a ROA.
Many large networks drop RPKI-invalid routes, and prefixes without a ROA are easier to hijack.
- Start with the invalid prefixes: networks running ROV already drop them, so part of the internet cannot reach them.
- Create a ROA for every prefix in the portal of the RIR or NIR that holds it: MyAPNIC, the IDNIC member portal, the RIPE NCC LIR Portal, ARIN Online, MyAFRINIC or MiLACNIC.
- The ROA origin must be the AS that actually announces the prefix. Set maxLength to the announced length; a loose maxLength leaves room for sub-prefix hijacks.
Invalid prefixes (19)
IRR route objects
Problem0 prefixes have an exact route object, 0 are covered by a larger one, 19 only have objects with another origin, 0 have none.
Upstreams and IXPs build prefix filters from the IRR. Prefixes without a route object can be dropped silently.
- Create route (IPv4) and route6 (IPv6) objects with your AS as origin in your RIR's IRR (for example APNIC via MyAPNIC, or IDNIC), or in RADB.
- Group your customers in one as-set and list it in PeeringDB so upstreams can build filters automatically.
Route object with another origin (19)
Upstream redundancy
Good4 upstream, 2 peer, 4 downstream.
With a single upstream, any outage there cuts your whole network off the internet.
Global visibility
Needs work15 of 19 prefixes are seen by at least half of the full-table feeds worldwide.
Prefixes seen only partly are usually caught by filters (no ROA or route object), too specific, or announced to domestic IXPs only.
- Check the ROA and route object of those prefixes, and keep them no longer than /24 for IPv4 or /48 for IPv6.
Prefixes with low visibility (4)
IPv6
Good2 IPv6 prefixes announced.
Most mobile users and large services already run on IPv6.
PeeringDB
ProblemNo PeeringDB profile.
Prospective peers and upstreams look up your contacts, policy and as-set in PeeringDB.
- Create or complete your profile at peeringdb.com: IRR as-set, peering policy, expected IPv4 and IPv6 prefix counts, and IX connections.
Prefix aggregation
Good17 IPv4 prefixes could be summarized into 14.
Deaggregation grows the global routing table. Splitting for traffic engineering is still reasonable.
Dropping invalid routes (ROV)
NoteSeen passing on 47 RPKI-invalid routes of other networks in sampled paths. This suggests the AS does not drop all invalid routes, for example those from its customers.
Not part of the score. It is inferred from sample AS paths, so the routes may come from exempted customers.
- Run an RPKI validator (for example Routinator or rpki-client) and reject invalid routes on your BGP sessions. MikroTik RouterOS 7 supports this through /routing rpki and the rpki-verify filter.
Example invalid routes (4)
Put the badge on your website
<a href="https://bgp.awancerah.cloud/en/AS65521/rapor"><img src="https://bgp.awancerah.cloud/en/AS65521/rapor.svg" alt="BGP report AS65521"></a>
[](https://bgp.awancerah.cloud/en/AS65521/rapor)