AwanCerahBGP
Home/France/AS59721
Autonomous System

SAFECLOUDBOX SAS

AS59721FranceRIPE NCC · since 2024

SAFECLOUDBOX-AS

A88/100Excellent

BGP report

Ranked 427 of 1,501 networks in France, 147 of 238 ISPs and transit networks. World rank 14,174.

  • RPKI ROA30/30
  • IRR route objects20/20
  • Upstream redundancy15/15
  • Global visibility8/10
  • IPv610/10
  • PeeringDB0/10
  • Prefix aggregation5/5

Computed from the route collector snapshot, IRR, RPKI and PeeringDB. How it is scored

Score history

RPKI ROA

Good
30/30

4 of 4 prefixes have a matching ROA (valid). 0 without a ROA.

Many large networks drop RPKI-invalid routes, and prefixes without a ROA are easier to hijack.

IRR route objects

Good
20/20

4 prefixes have an exact route object, 0 are covered by a larger one, 0 have none.

Upstreams and IXPs build prefix filters from the IRR. Prefixes without a route object can be dropped silently.

Upstream redundancy

Good
15/15

2 upstream, 1 peer, 1 downstream.

With a single upstream, any outage there cuts your whole network off the internet.

Upstream (2)

Global visibility

Needs work
8/10

3 of 4 prefixes are seen by at least half of the full-table feeds worldwide.

Prefixes seen only partly are usually caught by filters (no ROA or route object), too specific, or announced to domestic IXPs only.

How to fix
  1. Check the ROA and route object of those prefixes, and keep them no longer than /24 for IPv4 or /48 for IPv6.
Prefixes with low visibility (1)

IPv6

Good
10/10

1 IPv6 prefixes announced.

Most mobile users and large services already run on IPv6.

PeeringDB

Problem
0/10

No PeeringDB profile.

Prospective peers and upstreams look up your contacts, policy and as-set in PeeringDB.

How to fix
  1. Create or complete your profile at peeringdb.com: IRR as-set, peering policy, expected IPv4 and IPv6 prefix counts, and IX connections.

Prefix aggregation

Good
5/5

3 IPv4 prefixes could be summarized into 2.

Deaggregation grows the global routing table. Splitting for traffic engineering is still reasonable.

Dropping invalid routes (ROV)

Good

Not seen passing on RPKI-invalid routes of other networks in sampled paths.

Not part of the score. It is inferred from sample AS paths, so the routes may come from exempted customers.

Put the badge on your website

BGP report AS59721The badge updates with every snapshot.
HTML
<a href="https://bgp.awancerah.cloud/en/AS59721/rapor"><img src="https://bgp.awancerah.cloud/en/AS59721/rapor.svg" alt="BGP report AS59721"></a>
Markdown
[![BGP report AS59721](https://bgp.awancerah.cloud/en/AS59721/rapor.svg)](https://bgp.awancerah.cloud/en/AS59721/rapor)