AwanCerahBGP
Autonomous System

SWITCH

AS559SwitzerlandRIPE NCC · since 1993Educational/ResearchPeering: Selective

Switch

A100/100Excellent

BGP report

Ranked 9 of 795 networks in Switzerland, 9 of 101 ISPs and transit networks. World rank 197.

  • RPKI ROA30/30
  • IRR route objects20/20
  • Upstream redundancy15/15
  • Global visibility10/10
  • IPv610/10
  • PeeringDB10/10
  • Prefix aggregation5/5

Computed from the route collector snapshot, IRR, RPKI and PeeringDB. How it is scored

Score history

RPKI ROA

Needs work
30/30

124 of 126 prefixes have a matching ROA (valid). 2 without a ROA.

Many large networks drop RPKI-invalid routes, and prefixes without a ROA are easier to hijack.

How to fix
  1. Create a ROA for every prefix in the portal of the RIR or NIR that holds it: MyAPNIC, the IDNIC member portal, the RIPE NCC LIR Portal, ARIN Online, MyAFRINIC or MiLACNIC.
  2. The ROA origin must be the AS that actually announces the prefix. Set maxLength to the announced length; a loose maxLength leaves room for sub-prefix hijacks.
Prefixes without a ROA (2)

IRR route objects

Good
20/20

126 prefixes have an exact route object, 0 are covered by a larger one, 0 have none.

Upstreams and IXPs build prefix filters from the IRR. Prefixes without a route object can be dropped silently.

Global visibility

Good
10/10

126 of 126 prefixes are seen by at least half of the full-table feeds worldwide.

Prefixes seen only partly are usually caught by filters (no ROA or route object), too specific, or announced to domestic IXPs only.

IPv6

Good
10/10

9 IPv6 prefixes announced.

Most mobile users and large services already run on IPv6.

PeeringDB

Good
10/10

Profile exists, listed at 5 IX.

Prospective peers and upstreams look up your contacts, policy and as-set in PeeringDB.

Prefix aggregation

Good
5/5

117 IPv4 prefixes could be summarized into 106.

Deaggregation grows the global routing table. Splitting for traffic engineering is still reasonable.

Dropping invalid routes (ROV)

Note

Seen passing on 3 RPKI-invalid routes of other networks in sampled paths. This suggests the AS does not drop all invalid routes, for example those from its customers.

Not part of the score. It is inferred from sample AS paths, so the routes may come from exempted customers.

How to fix
  1. Run an RPKI validator (for example Routinator or rpki-client) and reject invalid routes on your BGP sessions. MikroTik RouterOS 7 supports this through /routing rpki and the rpki-verify filter.
Example invalid routes (3)

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