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Autonomous System

BAZA.NET LLC

AS49821RussiaRIPE NCC · since 2009Cable/DSL/ISPPeering: Open

BAZA-AS

A98/100Excellent

BGP report

Ranked 58 of 5,052 networks in Russia, 46 of 836 ISPs and transit networks. World rank 2,559.

  • RPKI ROA28/30
  • IRR route objects20/20
  • Upstream redundancy15/15
  • Global visibility10/10
  • IPv610/10
  • PeeringDB10/10
  • Prefix aggregation5/5

Computed from the route collector snapshot, IRR, RPKI and PeeringDB. How it is scored

Score history

RPKI ROA

Needs work
28/30

11 of 12 prefixes have a matching ROA (valid). 1 without a ROA.

Many large networks drop RPKI-invalid routes, and prefixes without a ROA are easier to hijack.

How to fix
  1. Create a ROA for every prefix in the portal of the RIR or NIR that holds it: MyAPNIC, the IDNIC member portal, the RIPE NCC LIR Portal, ARIN Online, MyAFRINIC or MiLACNIC.
  2. The ROA origin must be the AS that actually announces the prefix. Set maxLength to the announced length; a loose maxLength leaves room for sub-prefix hijacks.
Prefixes without a ROA (1)

IRR route objects

Good
20/20

12 prefixes have an exact route object, 0 are covered by a larger one, 0 have none.

Upstreams and IXPs build prefix filters from the IRR. Prefixes without a route object can be dropped silently.

Upstream redundancy

Good
15/15

12 upstream, 23 peer, 1 downstream.

With a single upstream, any outage there cuts your whole network off the internet.

Upstream (12)

Global visibility

Good
10/10

12 of 12 prefixes are seen by at least half of the full-table feeds worldwide.

Prefixes seen only partly are usually caught by filters (no ROA or route object), too specific, or announced to domestic IXPs only.

IPv6

Good
10/10

1 IPv6 prefixes announced.

Most mobile users and large services already run on IPv6.

PeeringDB

Good
10/10

Profile exists, listed at 2 IX.

Prospective peers and upstreams look up your contacts, policy and as-set in PeeringDB.

Prefix aggregation

Good
5/5

11 IPv4 prefixes could be summarized into 10.

Deaggregation grows the global routing table. Splitting for traffic engineering is still reasonable.

Dropping invalid routes (ROV)

Good

Not seen passing on RPKI-invalid routes of other networks in sampled paths.

Not part of the score. It is inferred from sample AS paths, so the routes may come from exempted customers.

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