AwanCerahBGP
Autonomous System

Signet B.V.

AS49685NetherlandsRIPE NCC · since 2014Cable/DSL/ISPNSPNetwork ServicesPeering: Selective

signetbreedband

signetbreedband.nl
Signet B.V. website
B82/100Good

BGP report

Ranked 556 of 1,130 networks in Netherlands, 170 of 217 ISPs and transit networks. World rank 21,016.

  • RPKI ROA30/30
  • IRR route objects2/20
  • Upstream redundancy15/15
  • Global visibility10/10
  • IPv610/10
  • PeeringDB10/10
  • Prefix aggregation5/5

Computed from the route collector snapshot, IRR, RPKI and PeeringDB. How it is scored

Score history

RPKI ROA

Good
30/30

36 of 36 prefixes have a matching ROA (valid). 0 without a ROA.

Many large networks drop RPKI-invalid routes, and prefixes without a ROA are easier to hijack.

IRR route objects

Problem
2/20

4 prefixes have an exact route object, 0 are covered by a larger one, 32 only have objects with another origin, 0 have none.

Upstreams and IXPs build prefix filters from the IRR. Prefixes without a route object can be dropped silently.

How to fix
  1. Create route (IPv4) and route6 (IPv6) objects with your AS as origin in your RIR's IRR (for example APNIC via MyAPNIC, or IDNIC), or in RADB.
  2. Group your customers in one as-set and list it in PeeringDB so upstreams can build filters automatically.
Route object with another origin (32)

Global visibility

Good
10/10

36 of 36 prefixes are seen by at least half of the full-table feeds worldwide.

Prefixes seen only partly are usually caught by filters (no ROA or route object), too specific, or announced to domestic IXPs only.

IPv6

Good
10/10

29 IPv6 prefixes announced.

Most mobile users and large services already run on IPv6.

PeeringDB

Good
10/10

Profile exists, listed at 2 IX.

Prospective peers and upstreams look up your contacts, policy and as-set in PeeringDB.

Prefix aggregation

Good
5/5

7 IPv4 prefixes could be summarized into 7.

Deaggregation grows the global routing table. Splitting for traffic engineering is still reasonable.

Dropping invalid routes (ROV)

Good

Not seen passing on RPKI-invalid routes of other networks in sampled paths.

Not part of the score. It is inferred from sample AS paths, so the routes may come from exempted customers.

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