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Autonomous System

Information Network, LLC

AS48416RussiaRIPE NCC · since 2008Cable/DSL/ISPPeering: Open

INFOLAN-AS

B83/100Good

BGP report

Ranked 508 of 5,052 networks in Russia, 251 of 841 ISPs and transit networks. World rank 20,375.

  • RPKI ROA30/30
  • IRR route objects20/20
  • Upstream redundancy15/15
  • Global visibility10/10
  • IPv60/10
  • PeeringDB8/10
  • Prefix aggregation0/5

Computed from the route collector snapshot, IRR, RPKI and PeeringDB. How it is scored

RPKI ROA

Good
30/30

8 of 8 prefixes have a matching ROA (valid). 0 without a ROA.

Many large networks drop RPKI-invalid routes, and prefixes without a ROA are easier to hijack.

IRR route objects

Good
20/20

8 prefixes have an exact route object, 0 are covered by a larger one, 0 have none.

Upstreams and IXPs build prefix filters from the IRR. Prefixes without a route object can be dropped silently.

Global visibility

Good
10/10

8 of 8 prefixes are seen by at least half of the full-table feeds worldwide.

Prefixes seen only partly are usually caught by filters (no ROA or route object), too specific, or announced to domestic IXPs only.

IPv6

Problem
0/10

No IPv6 prefix is announced.

Most mobile users and large services already run on IPv6.

How to fix
  1. Request an IPv6 block from your RIR or NIR if you have none, create its ROA and route6 object, then announce it to your upstreams.

PeeringDB

Needs work
8/10

Profile exists. Missing: IX connections.

Prospective peers and upstreams look up your contacts, policy and as-set in PeeringDB.

How to fix
  1. Create or complete your profile at peeringdb.com: IRR as-set, peering policy, expected IPv4 and IPv6 prefix counts, and IX connections.

Prefix aggregation

Problem
0/5

8 IPv4 prefixes could be summarized into 1.

Deaggregation grows the global routing table. Splitting for traffic engineering is still reasonable.

How to fix
  1. Announce the aggregate when the split is not needed. If it is intended, give every piece its own ROA and route object.

Dropping invalid routes (ROV)

Good

Not seen passing on RPKI-invalid routes of other networks in sampled paths.

Not part of the score. It is inferred from sample AS paths, so the routes may come from exempted customers.

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