AwanCerahBGP
Autonomous System

The Hong Kong Internet Exchange Limited

AS4641Hong KongAPNIC · since 1995Educational/ResearchPeering: Selective

HKIX-AS-AP

cuhk.edu.hk
The Hong Kong Internet Exchange Limited website
D53/100Poor

BGP report

Ranked 582 of 817 networks in Hong Kong, 174 of 194 ISPs and transit networks. World rank 60,973.

  • RPKI ROA1/30
  • IRR route objects16/20
  • Upstream redundancy15/15
  • Global visibility1/10
  • IPv610/10
  • PeeringDB10/10
  • Prefix aggregation0/5

Computed from the route collector snapshot, IRR, RPKI and PeeringDB. How it is scored

Score history

RPKI ROA

Needs work
1/30

1 of 39 prefixes have a matching ROA (valid). 38 without a ROA.

Many large networks drop RPKI-invalid routes, and prefixes without a ROA are easier to hijack.

How to fix
  1. Create a ROA for every prefix in the portal of the RIR or NIR that holds it: MyAPNIC, the IDNIC member portal, the RIPE NCC LIR Portal, ARIN Online, MyAFRINIC or MiLACNIC.
  2. The ROA origin must be the AS that actually announces the prefix. Set maxLength to the announced length; a loose maxLength leaves room for sub-prefix hijacks.
Prefixes without a ROA (38)

Upstream redundancy

Good
15/15

7 upstream, 24 peer, 3 downstream.

With a single upstream, any outage there cuts your whole network off the internet.

Upstream (7)

IPv6

Good
10/10

10 IPv6 prefixes announced.

Most mobile users and large services already run on IPv6.

PeeringDB

Good
10/10

Profile exists, listed at 1 IX.

Prospective peers and upstreams look up your contacts, policy and as-set in PeeringDB.

Prefix aggregation

Problem
0/5

29 IPv4 prefixes could be summarized into 2.

Deaggregation grows the global routing table. Splitting for traffic engineering is still reasonable.

How to fix
  1. Announce the aggregate when the split is not needed. If it is intended, give every piece its own ROA and route object.

Dropping invalid routes (ROV)

Note

Seen passing on 4 RPKI-invalid routes of other networks in sampled paths. This suggests the AS does not drop all invalid routes, for example those from its customers.

Not part of the score. It is inferred from sample AS paths, so the routes may come from exempted customers.

How to fix
  1. Run an RPKI validator (for example Routinator or rpki-client) and reject invalid routes on your BGP sessions. MikroTik RouterOS 7 supports this through /routing rpki and the rpki-verify filter.
Example invalid routes (4)

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