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Autonomous System

DOLPHIN TELECOMMUNICATION LIMITED

AS37613GhanaAFRINIC · since 2013NSPPeering: Selective

DOLPHIN TELECOMMUNICATION LIMITED

dolphintelecom.net
DOLPHIN TELECOMMUNICATION LIMITED website
A94/100Excellent

BGP report

Ranked 3 of 95 networks in Ghana, 3 of 16 ISPs and transit networks. World rank 6,501.

  • RPKI ROA30/30
  • IRR route objects18/20
  • Upstream redundancy15/15
  • Global visibility10/10
  • IPv610/10
  • PeeringDB10/10
  • Prefix aggregation1/5

Computed from the route collector snapshot, IRR, RPKI and PeeringDB. How it is scored

Score history

RPKI ROA

Good
30/30

9 of 9 prefixes have a matching ROA (valid). 0 without a ROA.

Many large networks drop RPKI-invalid routes, and prefixes without a ROA are easier to hijack.

IRR route objects

Good
18/20

6 prefixes have an exact route object, 3 are covered by a larger one, 0 have none.

Upstreams and IXPs build prefix filters from the IRR. Prefixes without a route object can be dropped silently.

Covered by a larger object (3)

Global visibility

Good
10/10

9 of 9 prefixes are seen by at least half of the full-table feeds worldwide.

Prefixes seen only partly are usually caught by filters (no ROA or route object), too specific, or announced to domestic IXPs only.

IPv6

Good
10/10

1 IPv6 prefixes announced.

Most mobile users and large services already run on IPv6.

PeeringDB

Good
10/10

Profile exists, listed at 9 IX.

Prospective peers and upstreams look up your contacts, policy and as-set in PeeringDB.

Prefix aggregation

Problem
1/5

8 IPv4 prefixes could be summarized into 2.

Deaggregation grows the global routing table. Splitting for traffic engineering is still reasonable.

How to fix
  1. Announce the aggregate when the split is not needed. If it is intended, give every piece its own ROA and route object.

Dropping invalid routes (ROV)

Note

Seen passing on 1 RPKI-invalid routes of other networks in sampled paths. This suggests the AS does not drop all invalid routes, for example those from its customers.

Not part of the score. It is inferred from sample AS paths, so the routes may come from exempted customers.

How to fix
  1. Run an RPKI validator (for example Routinator or rpki-client) and reject invalid routes on your BGP sessions. MikroTik RouterOS 7 supports this through /routing rpki and the rpki-verify filter.
Example invalid routes (1)

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