AwanCerahBGP
Autonomous System

FIRSTNET TECHNOLOGY SERVICES (PTY) LTD

AS328366South AfricaAFRINIC · since 2018Cable/DSL/ISPPeering: Open

FIRSTNET TECHNOLOGY SERVICES (PTY) LTD

A87/100Excellent

BGP report

Ranked 210 of 668 networks in South Africa, 56 of 116 ISPs and transit networks. World rank 15,988.

  • RPKI ROA30/30
  • IRR route objects20/20
  • Upstream redundancy15/15
  • Global visibility2/10
  • IPv610/10
  • PeeringDB10/10
  • Prefix aggregation0/5

Computed from the route collector snapshot, IRR, RPKI and PeeringDB. How it is scored

Score history

RPKI ROA

Good
30/30

90 of 90 prefixes have a matching ROA (valid). 0 without a ROA.

Many large networks drop RPKI-invalid routes, and prefixes without a ROA are easier to hijack.

IRR route objects

Good
20/20

87 prefixes have an exact route object, 3 are covered by a larger one, 0 have none.

Upstreams and IXPs build prefix filters from the IRR. Prefixes without a route object can be dropped silently.

Covered by a larger object (3)

Global visibility

Problem
2/10

16 of 90 prefixes are seen by at least half of the full-table feeds worldwide.

Prefixes seen only partly are usually caught by filters (no ROA or route object), too specific, or announced to domestic IXPs only.

How to fix
  1. Check the ROA and route object of those prefixes, and keep them no longer than /24 for IPv4 or /48 for IPv6.
Prefixes with low visibility (74)

IPv6

Good
10/10

4 IPv6 prefixes announced.

Most mobile users and large services already run on IPv6.

PeeringDB

Good
10/10

Profile exists, listed at 14 IX.

Prospective peers and upstreams look up your contacts, policy and as-set in PeeringDB.

Prefix aggregation

Problem
0/5

86 IPv4 prefixes could be summarized into 12.

Deaggregation grows the global routing table. Splitting for traffic engineering is still reasonable.

How to fix
  1. Announce the aggregate when the split is not needed. If it is intended, give every piece its own ROA and route object.

Dropping invalid routes (ROV)

Good

Not seen passing on RPKI-invalid routes of other networks in sampled paths.

Not part of the score. It is inferred from sample AS paths, so the routes may come from exempted customers.

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