BGP report
Ranked 3,010 of 8,802 networks in Brazil, 1,261 of 2,502 ISPs and transit networks. World rank 23,809.
Computed from the route collector snapshot, IRR, RPKI and PeeringDB. How it is scored
RPKI ROA
Needs work511 of 530 prefixes have a matching ROA (valid). 19 without a ROA.
Many large networks drop RPKI-invalid routes, and prefixes without a ROA are easier to hijack.
- Create a ROA for every prefix in the portal of the RIR or NIR that holds it: MyAPNIC, the IDNIC member portal, the RIPE NCC LIR Portal, ARIN Online, MyAFRINIC or MiLACNIC.
- The ROA origin must be the AS that actually announces the prefix. Set maxLength to the announced length; a loose maxLength leaves room for sub-prefix hijacks.
IRR route objects
Good54 prefixes have an exact route object, 476 are covered by a larger one, 0 have none.
Upstreams and IXPs build prefix filters from the IRR. Prefixes without a route object can be dropped silently.
Covered by a larger object (476)
Upstream redundancy
Good27 upstream, 156 peer, 83 downstream.
With a single upstream, any outage there cuts your whole network off the internet.
Upstream (27)
Global visibility
Problem42 of 530 prefixes are seen by at least half of the full-table feeds worldwide.
Prefixes seen only partly are usually caught by filters (no ROA or route object), too specific, or announced to domestic IXPs only.
- Check the ROA and route object of those prefixes, and keep them no longer than /24 for IPv4 or /48 for IPv6.
Prefixes with low visibility (488)
IPv6
Good370 IPv6 prefixes announced.
Most mobile users and large services already run on IPv6.
PeeringDB
GoodProfile exists, listed at 13 IX.
Prospective peers and upstreams look up your contacts, policy and as-set in PeeringDB.
Prefix aggregation
Problem160 IPv4 prefixes could be summarized into 4.
Deaggregation grows the global routing table. Splitting for traffic engineering is still reasonable.
- Announce the aggregate when the split is not needed. If it is intended, give every piece its own ROA and route object.
Dropping invalid routes (ROV)
NoteSeen passing on 2 RPKI-invalid routes of other networks in sampled paths. This suggests the AS does not drop all invalid routes, for example those from its customers.
Not part of the score. It is inferred from sample AS paths, so the routes may come from exempted customers.
- Run an RPKI validator (for example Routinator or rpki-client) and reject invalid routes on your BGP sessions. MikroTik RouterOS 7 supports this through /routing rpki and the rpki-verify filter.
Example invalid routes (2)
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