AwanCerahBGP
Autonomous System

CRISP S.A.

AS28022Costa RicaLACNIC · since 2008Cable/DSL/ISPPeering: Selective

AS28022

B82/100Good

BGP report

Ranked 35 of 87 networks in Costa Rica, 13 of 17 ISPs and transit networks. World rank 21,136.

  • RPKI ROA30/30
  • IRR route objects15/20
  • Upstream redundancy7/15
  • Global visibility10/10
  • IPv610/10
  • PeeringDB10/10
  • Prefix aggregation0/5

Computed from the route collector snapshot, IRR, RPKI and PeeringDB. How it is scored

Score history

RPKI ROA

Good
30/30

17 of 17 prefixes have a matching ROA (valid). 0 without a ROA.

Many large networks drop RPKI-invalid routes, and prefixes without a ROA are easier to hijack.

IRR route objects

Good
15/20

1 prefixes have an exact route object, 16 are covered by a larger one, 0 have none.

Upstreams and IXPs build prefix filters from the IRR. Prefixes without a route object can be dropped silently.

Covered by a larger object (16)

Upstream redundancy

Problem
7/15

1 upstream, 0 peer, 2 downstream.

With a single upstream, any outage there cuts your whole network off the internet.

How to fix
  1. Add a second upstream from a different provider, and join an IXP to peer directly with other networks.
Upstream (1)

Global visibility

Good
10/10

17 of 17 prefixes are seen by at least half of the full-table feeds worldwide.

Prefixes seen only partly are usually caught by filters (no ROA or route object), too specific, or announced to domestic IXPs only.

IPv6

Good
10/10

1 IPv6 prefixes announced.

Most mobile users and large services already run on IPv6.

PeeringDB

Good
10/10

Profile exists, listed at 2 IX.

Prospective peers and upstreams look up your contacts, policy and as-set in PeeringDB.

Prefix aggregation

Problem
0/5

16 IPv4 prefixes could be summarized into 1.

Deaggregation grows the global routing table. Splitting for traffic engineering is still reasonable.

How to fix
  1. Announce the aggregate when the split is not needed. If it is intended, give every piece its own ROA and route object.

Dropping invalid routes (ROV)

Good

Not seen passing on RPKI-invalid routes of other networks in sampled paths.

Not part of the score. It is inferred from sample AS paths, so the routes may come from exempted customers.

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