GCA Telecom
AS27708
BGP report
Ranked 4 of 40 networks in El Salvador, 3 of 10 ISPs and transit networks. World rank 14,127.
Computed from the route collector snapshot, IRR, RPKI and PeeringDB. How it is scored
RPKI ROA
Good16 of 16 prefixes have a matching ROA (valid). 0 without a ROA.
Many large networks drop RPKI-invalid routes, and prefixes without a ROA are easier to hijack.
IRR route objects
Needs work9 prefixes have an exact route object, 6 are covered by a larger one, 1 have none.
Upstreams and IXPs build prefix filters from the IRR. Prefixes without a route object can be dropped silently.
- Create route (IPv4) and route6 (IPv6) objects with your AS as origin in your RIR's IRR (for example APNIC via MyAPNIC, or IDNIC), or in RADB.
- Group your customers in one as-set and list it in PeeringDB so upstreams can build filters automatically.
No route object (1)
Covered by a larger object (6)
Upstream redundancy
Good2 upstream, 0 peer, 1 downstream.
With a single upstream, any outage there cuts your whole network off the internet.
Upstream (2)
Global visibility
Good16 of 16 prefixes are seen by at least half of the full-table feeds worldwide.
Prefixes seen only partly are usually caught by filters (no ROA or route object), too specific, or announced to domestic IXPs only.
IPv6
Good1 IPv6 prefixes announced.
Most mobile users and large services already run on IPv6.
PeeringDB
Needs workProfile exists. Missing: IRR as-set, IX connections, prefix counts.
Prospective peers and upstreams look up your contacts, policy and as-set in PeeringDB.
- Create or complete your profile at peeringdb.com: IRR as-set, peering policy, expected IPv4 and IPv6 prefix counts, and IX connections.
Prefix aggregation
Problem15 IPv4 prefixes could be summarized into 4.
Deaggregation grows the global routing table. Splitting for traffic engineering is still reasonable.
- Announce the aggregate when the split is not needed. If it is intended, give every piece its own ROA and route object.
Dropping invalid routes (ROV)
GoodNot seen passing on RPKI-invalid routes of other networks in sampled paths.
Not part of the score. It is inferred from sample AS paths, so the routes may come from exempted customers.
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