AwanCerahBGP
Autonomous System

Cable Atlantico SRL

AS265721Dominican RepublicLACNIC · since 2017Cable/DSL/ISPPeering: Open

AS265721

cableatlantico.com
Cable Atlantico SRL website
B80/100Good

BGP report

Ranked 85 of 203 networks in Dominican Republic, 24 of 42 ISPs and transit networks. World rank 24,391.

  • RPKI ROA30/30
  • IRR route objects16/20
  • Upstream redundancy7/15
  • Global visibility9/10
  • IPv610/10
  • PeeringDB8/10
  • Prefix aggregation0/5

Computed from the route collector snapshot, IRR, RPKI and PeeringDB. How it is scored

Score history

RPKI ROA

Good
30/30

132 of 132 prefixes have a matching ROA (valid). 0 without a ROA.

Many large networks drop RPKI-invalid routes, and prefixes without a ROA are easier to hijack.

IRR route objects

Good
16/20

23 prefixes have an exact route object, 109 are covered by a larger one, 0 have none.

Upstreams and IXPs build prefix filters from the IRR. Prefixes without a route object can be dropped silently.

Covered by a larger object (109)
38.9.16.0/2438.9.17.0/2438.9.18.0/2438.9.19.0/2438.9.20.0/2438.9.21.0/2438.9.22.0/2438.9.23.0/2438.9.24.0/2438.9.25.0/2438.9.26.0/2438.9.27.0/2438.9.28.0/2438.9.29.0/2438.9.30.0/2438.9.31.0/2438.50.176.0/2438.50.177.0/2438.50.178.0/2438.50.179.0/2438.50.180.0/2438.50.181.0/2438.50.182.0/2438.50.183.0/2438.50.184.0/2238.50.184.0/2438.50.185.0/2438.50.186.0/2438.50.187.0/2438.50.188.0/2338.50.188.0/2438.50.189.0/2438.50.190.0/2338.50.190.0/2438.50.191.0/2438.188.0.0/2138.188.0.0/2438.188.1.0/2438.188.2.0/2438.188.3.0/2438.188.4.0/2438.188.5.0/2438.188.6.0/2438.188.7.0/2438.188.8.0/2138.188.16.0/2438.188.17.0/2438.188.18.0/2438.188.19.0/2438.188.20.0/2438.188.21.0/2438.188.22.0/2438.188.23.0/2438.188.24.0/2438.188.25.0/2438.188.26.0/2438.188.27.0/2438.188.28.0/2438.188.29.0/2438.188.31.0/24128.201.112.0/24128.201.113.0/24128.201.114.0/24128.201.115.0/24154.56.32.0/20154.56.48.0/21154.56.56.0/24154.56.57.0/24204.157.186.0/24204.157.187.0/24206.2.128.0/24206.2.129.0/24206.2.130.0/24206.2.131.0/24206.2.132.0/24206.2.133.0/24206.2.134.0/24206.2.135.0/24206.2.136.0/24206.2.137.0/24206.2.138.0/24206.2.139.0/24206.2.140.0/24206.2.141.0/24206.2.142.0/24206.2.143.0/24206.2.144.0/20206.2.144.0/24206.2.145.0/24206.2.146.0/24206.2.160.0/21206.2.168.0/24206.2.169.0/24206.84.240.0/24206.84.241.0/24206.84.242.0/24206.84.243.0/24206.84.244.0/24206.84.245.0/24206.84.246.0/24206.84.247.0/24206.84.248.0/24206.84.249.0/24206.84.250.0/24206.84.251.0/24206.84.252.0/24206.84.253.0/24206.84.254.0/24206.84.255.0/24

Upstream redundancy

Problem
7/15

1 upstream, 2 peer, 11 downstream.

With a single upstream, any outage there cuts your whole network off the internet.

How to fix
  1. Add a second upstream from a different provider, and join an IXP to peer directly with other networks.
Upstream (1)

Global visibility

Needs work
9/10

122 of 132 prefixes are seen by at least half of the full-table feeds worldwide.

Prefixes seen only partly are usually caught by filters (no ROA or route object), too specific, or announced to domestic IXPs only.

How to fix
  1. Check the ROA and route object of those prefixes, and keep them no longer than /24 for IPv4 or /48 for IPv6.
Prefixes with low visibility (10)

IPv6

Good
10/10

2 IPv6 prefixes announced.

Most mobile users and large services already run on IPv6.

PeeringDB

Needs work
8/10

Profile exists. Missing: IX connections.

Prospective peers and upstreams look up your contacts, policy and as-set in PeeringDB.

How to fix
  1. Create or complete your profile at peeringdb.com: IRR as-set, peering policy, expected IPv4 and IPv6 prefix counts, and IX connections.

Prefix aggregation

Problem
0/5

130 IPv4 prefixes could be summarized into 10.

Deaggregation grows the global routing table. Splitting for traffic engineering is still reasonable.

How to fix
  1. Announce the aggregate when the split is not needed. If it is intended, give every piece its own ROA and route object.

Dropping invalid routes (ROV)

Note

Seen passing on 45 RPKI-invalid routes of other networks in sampled paths. This suggests the AS does not drop all invalid routes, for example those from its customers.

Not part of the score. It is inferred from sample AS paths, so the routes may come from exempted customers.

How to fix
  1. Run an RPKI validator (for example Routinator or rpki-client) and reject invalid routes on your BGP sessions. MikroTik RouterOS 7 supports this through /routing rpki and the rpki-verify filter.
Example invalid routes (4)

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