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Autonomous System

Christian Elsen

AS213151GermanyRIPE NCC · since 2020Network ServicesPeering: Open

CHRISELSEN

A99/100Excellent

BGP report

Ranked 235 of 2,649 networks in Germany. World rank 2,160.

  • RPKI ROA30/30
  • IRR route objects20/20
  • Upstream redundancy15/15
  • Global visibility9/10
  • IPv610/10
  • PeeringDB10/10
  • Prefix aggregation5/5

Computed from the route collector snapshot, IRR, RPKI and PeeringDB. How it is scored

Score history

RPKI ROA

Good
30/30

13 of 13 prefixes have a matching ROA (valid). 0 without a ROA.

Many large networks drop RPKI-invalid routes, and prefixes without a ROA are easier to hijack.

IRR route objects

Good
20/20

13 prefixes have an exact route object, 0 are covered by a larger one, 0 have none.

Upstreams and IXPs build prefix filters from the IRR. Prefixes without a route object can be dropped silently.

Upstream redundancy

Good
15/15

9 upstream, 1,006 peer, 0 downstream.

With a single upstream, any outage there cuts your whole network off the internet.

Upstream (9)

Global visibility

Needs work
9/10

12 of 13 prefixes are seen by at least half of the full-table feeds worldwide.

Prefixes seen only partly are usually caught by filters (no ROA or route object), too specific, or announced to domestic IXPs only.

How to fix
  1. Check the ROA and route object of those prefixes, and keep them no longer than /24 for IPv4 or /48 for IPv6.
Prefixes with low visibility (1)

IPv6

Good
10/10

12 IPv6 prefixes announced.

Most mobile users and large services already run on IPv6.

PeeringDB

Good
10/10

Profile exists, listed at 3 IX.

Prospective peers and upstreams look up your contacts, policy and as-set in PeeringDB.

Prefix aggregation

Good
5/5

1 IPv4 prefixes could be summarized into 1.

Deaggregation grows the global routing table. Splitting for traffic engineering is still reasonable.

Dropping invalid routes (ROV)

Note

Seen passing on 244 RPKI-invalid routes of other networks in sampled paths. This suggests the AS does not drop all invalid routes, for example those from its customers.

Not part of the score. It is inferred from sample AS paths, so the routes may come from exempted customers.

How to fix
  1. Run an RPKI validator (for example Routinator or rpki-client) and reject invalid routes on your BGP sessions. MikroTik RouterOS 7 supports this through /routing rpki and the rpki-verify filter.
Example invalid routes (4)

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