BGP report
Ranked 309 of 2,170 networks in Poland, 120 of 305 ISPs and transit networks. World rank 13,141.
Computed from the route collector snapshot, IRR, RPKI and PeeringDB. How it is scored
RPKI ROA
Needs work46 of 47 prefixes have a matching ROA (valid). 1 without a ROA.
Many large networks drop RPKI-invalid routes, and prefixes without a ROA are easier to hijack.
- Create a ROA for every prefix in the portal of the RIR or NIR that holds it: MyAPNIC, the IDNIC member portal, the RIPE NCC LIR Portal, ARIN Online, MyAFRINIC or MiLACNIC.
- The ROA origin must be the AS that actually announces the prefix. Set maxLength to the announced length; a loose maxLength leaves room for sub-prefix hijacks.
Prefixes without a ROA (1)
IRR route objects
Good47 prefixes have an exact route object, 0 are covered by a larger one, 0 have none.
Upstreams and IXPs build prefix filters from the IRR. Prefixes without a route object can be dropped silently.
Upstream redundancy
Problem1 upstream, 0 peer, 23 downstream.
With a single upstream, any outage there cuts your whole network off the internet.
- Add a second upstream from a different provider, and join an IXP to peer directly with other networks.
Upstream (1)
Global visibility
Good47 of 47 prefixes are seen by at least half of the full-table feeds worldwide.
Prefixes seen only partly are usually caught by filters (no ROA or route object), too specific, or announced to domestic IXPs only.
IPv6
Good2 IPv6 prefixes announced.
Most mobile users and large services already run on IPv6.
PeeringDB
Needs workProfile exists. Missing: IX connections.
Prospective peers and upstreams look up your contacts, policy and as-set in PeeringDB.
- Create or complete your profile at peeringdb.com: IRR as-set, peering policy, expected IPv4 and IPv6 prefix counts, and IX connections.
Prefix aggregation
Good45 IPv4 prefixes could be summarized into 41.
Deaggregation grows the global routing table. Splitting for traffic engineering is still reasonable.
Dropping invalid routes (ROV)
GoodNot seen passing on RPKI-invalid routes of other networks in sampled paths.
Not part of the score. It is inferred from sample AS paths, so the routes may come from exempted customers.
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