BGP report
Ranked 42 of 242 networks in Ecuador, 10 of 27 ISPs and transit networks. World rank 10,237.
Computed from the route collector snapshot, IRR, RPKI and PeeringDB. How it is scored
RPKI ROA
Good363 of 363 prefixes have a matching ROA (valid). 0 without a ROA.
Many large networks drop RPKI-invalid routes, and prefixes without a ROA are easier to hijack.
IRR route objects
Needs work33 prefixes have an exact route object, 329 are covered by a larger one, 1 only have objects with another origin, 0 have none.
Upstreams and IXPs build prefix filters from the IRR. Prefixes without a route object can be dropped silently.
- Create route (IPv4) and route6 (IPv6) objects with your AS as origin in your RIR's IRR (for example APNIC via MyAPNIC, or IDNIC), or in RADB.
- Group your customers in one as-set and list it in PeeringDB so upstreams can build filters automatically.
Route object with another origin (1)
Covered by a larger object (329)
Upstream redundancy
Good7 upstream, 1 peer, 3 downstream.
With a single upstream, any outage there cuts your whole network off the internet.
Global visibility
Needs work347 of 363 prefixes are seen by at least half of the full-table feeds worldwide.
Prefixes seen only partly are usually caught by filters (no ROA or route object), too specific, or announced to domestic IXPs only.
- Check the ROA and route object of those prefixes, and keep them no longer than /24 for IPv4 or /48 for IPv6.
Prefixes with low visibility (16)
IPv6
Good103 IPv6 prefixes announced.
Most mobile users and large services already run on IPv6.
PeeringDB
GoodProfile exists, listed at 2 IX.
Prospective peers and upstreams look up your contacts, policy and as-set in PeeringDB.
Prefix aggregation
Problem260 IPv4 prefixes could be summarized into 10.
Deaggregation grows the global routing table. Splitting for traffic engineering is still reasonable.
- Announce the aggregate when the split is not needed. If it is intended, give every piece its own ROA and route object.
Dropping invalid routes (ROV)
GoodNot seen passing on RPKI-invalid routes of other networks in sampled paths.
Not part of the score. It is inferred from sample AS paths, so the routes may come from exempted customers.
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