Mango Teleservices Limited (ISP)
MTSL-ISP-AP

BGP report
Ranked 358 of 1,575 networks in Bangladesh, 129 of 221 ISPs and transit networks. World rank 16,020.
Computed from the route collector snapshot, IRR, RPKI and PeeringDB. How it is scored
RPKI ROA
Good26 of 26 prefixes have a matching ROA (valid). 0 without a ROA.
Many large networks drop RPKI-invalid routes, and prefixes without a ROA are easier to hijack.
IRR route objects
Good26 prefixes have an exact route object, 0 are covered by a larger one, 0 have none.
Upstreams and IXPs build prefix filters from the IRR. Prefixes without a route object can be dropped silently.
Upstream redundancy
Good3 upstream, 4 peer, 4 downstream.
With a single upstream, any outage there cuts your whole network off the internet.
Global visibility
Needs work23 of 26 prefixes are seen by at least half of the full-table feeds worldwide.
Prefixes seen only partly are usually caught by filters (no ROA or route object), too specific, or announced to domestic IXPs only.
- Check the ROA and route object of those prefixes, and keep them no longer than /24 for IPv4 or /48 for IPv6.
Prefixes with low visibility (3)
IPv6
ProblemNo IPv6 prefix is announced.
Most mobile users and large services already run on IPv6.
- Request an IPv6 block from your RIR or NIR if you have none, create its ROA and route6 object, then announce it to your upstreams.
PeeringDB
GoodProfile exists, listed at 4 IX.
Prospective peers and upstreams look up your contacts, policy and as-set in PeeringDB.
Prefix aggregation
Needs work26 IPv4 prefixes could be summarized into 14.
Deaggregation grows the global routing table. Splitting for traffic engineering is still reasonable.
- Announce the aggregate when the split is not needed. If it is intended, give every piece its own ROA and route object.
Dropping invalid routes (ROV)
NoteSeen passing on 1 RPKI-invalid routes of other networks in sampled paths. This suggests the AS does not drop all invalid routes, for example those from its customers.
Not part of the score. It is inferred from sample AS paths, so the routes may come from exempted customers.
- Run an RPKI validator (for example Routinator or rpki-client) and reject invalid routes on your BGP sessions. MikroTik RouterOS 7 supports this through /routing rpki and the rpki-verify filter.
Example invalid routes (1)
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<a href="https://bgp.awancerah.cloud/en/AS132608/rapor"><img src="https://bgp.awancerah.cloud/en/AS132608/rapor.svg" alt="BGP report AS132608"></a>
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